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ABSTRACT
CONVERGING CRITERIA: WHAT DECISION PROCESSES REVEAL ABOUT
CONFIDENCE IN MEMORY
SEPTEMBER 2022
JOHANNY N. CASTILLO, B.A., RHODE ISLAND COLLEGE
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Jeffrey J. Starns
Source memory is our ability to relate central information (the “item”) to the
context (the “source”) in which it was learned or experienced. People are often highly
confident in their source judgements even when this information is incorrectly recalled.
Past work has aimed to explain why source errors made with high confidence occur with
a framework called the Converging Criteria (CC) account. The CC account posits that
item memory can interact with source memory by altering decision criteria as item
confidence increases, increasing the probability of a high confidence source judgement.
This prediction differs from alternate models, like the Fixed Criteria (FC) account, where
decision criteria are not expected to change with item confidence. The current study not
only tests the implications of the CC account, but contrasts it to the predictions of the FC
account relative to item memory, item confidence, and source discriminability, using
existing data from 12 recognition memory experiments. We use a Bayesian Hierarchical
model to estimate a key metric called the Item Confidence Effect (ICE) - the change in
the proportion of source errors made with high confidence as item confidence increases.
Results show a positive ICE, demonstrating that the proportion of source errors made
with high confidence increases with item confidence, as predicted by the CC account. In
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the context of memory, this evidence shows that decision processes can influence
behavior, regardless if evidence in memory supports it or not.
Keywords: Decision-making, confidence, episodic memory, Bayesian modelling,
signal detection models
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Source memory is our ability to relate central information (the “item”) to the context
(the “source”) in which it was learned or experienced (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay,
1993). Often, we can be highly confident in our source judgements even when the
incorrect source is recalled. To illustrate this, imagine a scenario in which every day on
your way to work, you pass a beautiful brooch displayed in a store window. You think it
would make a great gift, and maybe even mention it in conversation to some of your
family members. Soon enough, you and your partner’s anniversary comes up, and you
decide to get them the brooch because you’re sure they were raving about it. However, as
you hand over the brooch, you become disappointed to hear that it’s not the gift they
were expecting. Immediately, you remember that it was actually your mother who loved
the brooch, and not your partner – revealing a high confidence source error.
Situations in which a person is highly confident of their source judgment, despite
the judgement being wrong, might reflect the use of item memory (in this case, the highly
familiar brooch) to decide how sure we are that the event occurred in the context that we
think it did (in this case, who wanted the brooch most). That is, item memory interacts
with source memory to produce a source confidence judgment, meaning that source
confidence judgements are not based on source memory strength alone. High-confidence
source judgments have previously been understood to be a result of recollection – a
putative memory process (Yonelinas, 2007). However, the presence of a decision
component – evidenced by the fact that item memory influences source confidence
judgements – shows the importance of understanding decision making in the context of

1

memory tasks to determine which cognitive process is contributing to the high confidence
source judgements, and in particular, high confidence source errors. This issue is the
focus of the current study.
1.1 Recognition memory and the signal detection model
One way to understand the relationship between item memory and source
confidence is with receiver operating characteristic (ROC) functions. An ROC plots the
relationship between the proportion of times a studied item is correctly identified as
studied (i.e., a hit) against the proportion of times a non-studied item is incorrectly
identified as studied (i.e., a false alarm) across multiple levels of response bias (Starns
and Ksander, 2016; Yonelinas, 2007). ROCs can accommodate a number of different
tasks, but a standard recognition memory task is the most traditional use of ROCs. Under
this paradigm, a subject is first presented with a list of words to study. They are then
tested for recognition of the words on the list, along with some that they had not studied

Figure 1. ROC and zROC curves. Left panel illustrates a hypothetical ROC curve in
which the proportion of hits and false alarms across 6 levels of confidence are plotted
against each other. Z-transforming the scores results in the zROC curve on the right
panel. Figures adapted from Higham and Arnold, 2007.
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before (i.e., lures), by being asked to indicate whether a given word is old or new.
Participants are asked to give a confidence rating, for example, they may respond on a 6point scale ranging from 6-“very confident old” to 1-“very confident new”. To illustrate
how an ROC function is constructed, suppose that the test list contains 20 items that are
old, and 20 that are new. If 5 items received a highly confident (“6”) response, but only 4
of those are actually old (meaning the other item is new), the false alarm rate is 1/20, or
0.05 and the hit rate is equal to 4/20, or 0.20. The first coordinate (0.05, 0.20) can then be
plotted on the ROC. For the next confidence level (“5”), both “5” and “6” responses are
considered together. Suppose that 9 items received a “5” confidence rating, and of those
9, 6 were actually old, and the other 3 were new. The next false alarm is correspondingly
calculated as (1 + 3)/20, or 0.2, and the next hit rate is calculated by combining items
rated “5” and “6”, giving (4 + 6)/20, or 0.5. This coordinate, (0.20, 0.50) is plotted. This
process continues until all confidence levels are accounted for. Thus, each point on the
resulting ROC function represents the proportion of hits to false alarms at a given
confidence level. The first panel in Figure 1 shows a hypothetical ROC curve. Further,
ROCs can be standardized with a z-transformation, resulting in a zROC function. Now,
rather than the typical inverted u-shaped curve, a linear function arises that can be used to
more clearly explain cognitive processes underlying the function. The second panel in
Figure 1 illustrates how the ROC transforms to a zROC. The y-intercept here, for
example, can be used to determine response accuracy, and the slope, which represents a
measure of asymmetry, can be used to make inferences about the relative contribution of
memory processes like recollection or familiarity (Yonelinas, 1994).
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Figure 2. Schematic for the Signal Detection framework. The distribution on the left
represents lures or "new" items, while the distribution on the right represents targets or
"old" items. The vertical bold line represents the decision criterion, which marks the
amount of evidence needed to endorse an “old” or “new” response. Figure adapted
from Higham and Arnold, 2007.
ROC functions are most popularly analyzed under a signal detection framework
Figure 3 Schematic for the Signal Detection framework. The distribution on the left
in
which changes
the response
criterion
changes
the represents
likelihood targets
of
represents
lures orin"new"
items, while
the represent
distribution
on thein
right
or
"old" items. The vertical bold line represents the decision criterion, which marks the
endorsing
an evidence
item as old
or new
in a source
task,
the correct
source
over the
amount of
needed
to or,
endorse
an “old”
or choosing
“new” response.
Figure
adapted
from Higham and Arnold, 2007.
incorrect source. In this way, signal detection models have been used to understand both
item recognition and source memory (e.g., Decarlo, 2003). In traditional recognition
memory tasks, it is assumed that items that have been studied before have greater
memory strength than those that have not been studied before. However, there is
variability in the strength of both studied and non-studied items such that overlapping
normal distributions result. The distance between the two distributions, better known as
d’ (a measure of discriminability) tells us how much stronger memory is for studied items
versus non studied items. The decision to indicate an item as old or new is determined by
the response criterion that lies somewhere along the x-axis on which the distributions are
displayed. The placement of the criterion, along with the two distributions, results in four
possible outcomes for a decision; a hit, false alarm, (both of which are used in ROCs, as

4

described above), a correct rejection, or a miss. Figure 2 depicts the criterion as a thick,
vertical line between the two distributions. Any memory signal that exceeds that criterion
will result in an “old” response (Wixted, 2007); any signal below it will engender a
“new” response. Similarly, if we were looking at source recall, anything exceeding the
criterion would result in a “Source B” response, and anything below, a “Source A”
response. Importantly, these continuous signals attributed to studied and non-studied
items (or source “A” and “B”) are assumed to follow normal distributions with the same
variance. Using these signals to construct a zROC function would produce a linear zROC
curve with a slope of 1.
With most signal detection models, a single criterion represents a mid-point that
separates the evidence into two response regions; “old” and “new” evidence or “Source
A” evidence versus “Source B” evidence. However, it’s important to make clear, that
multiple decision criteria can exist. Indeed, with the introduction of confidence
judgments, the model requires multiple criteria, where each one not only provides a cutoff point that separates two response types, but also represents the quantity of evidence
needed to make a response with a particular level of confidence, e.g. low, moderate, or
high. Critically, most signal detection models assume that these criteria are fixed across
different conditions possessing different levels of item evidence. This means that the only
factor that can change the likelihood of a given response across conditions is the
discriminability of the items, or source events, corresponding to the two response options.
The more discriminable the response options, the less we would expect errors to occur,
because there is less overlap in the distributions. This gives us some insight into the
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proportion of source errors and correct source judgements we can expect across multiple
levels of item confidence. These ideas are described in greater detail below.
1.2 The Converging Criteria Model
ROC functions can also be a useful tool to visualize and validate the predictions
of new models, as we will demonstrate later in this section. Of course, the inferences that
can be made from these ROC functions depend heavily on the theoretical framework
used. While ROCs have been important to understanding recognition memory,
particularly in the context of dual-process models (Yonelinas, 1994; Yonelinas, 2002),
ROCs can accommodate alternative models of decision making just as well, including
models that take other forms – like Gaussian signal detection models. A decision account,
like the Converging Criteria (CC) model (Starns & Ksander, 2016) provides one
explanation for how item memory can influence source confidence. This model predicts
that a higher number of high confidence source judgments would be made if the
standards for making a high-confidence source judgment are laxer for strong than weak
item memories. In other words, participants apply a decision heuristic in which they are
more likely to make a high confidence source judgement if they are more confident that
the item was studied because the decision criteria surrounding the source decision pull
closer together as item confidence increases (Starns and Ksander, 2016; Starns,
Pazzaglia, Rotello & Hautus, 2013).The CC model accounts for patterns of findings
regarding item and source confidence by proposing that participants are more likely to
make a high confidence source judgment if they are more confident that the item itself
was studied. Figure 3 presents the CC model represented as bivariate Gaussian
distributions. The x-axis depicts source evidence ranging from strong evidence that the
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item was studied with Source B to strong evidence that it was studied with Source A. The
y-axis shows item strength ranging from strong evidence that the item was not studied
(new) to strong evidence that the item was studied (old). The ovals represent bivariate
Gaussian distributions for items studied with Source A, items studied with Source B, and
new items. Every point on a given contour has the same probability density within the
bivariate distribution, and the center marks the mean of each distribution. Item evidence
translates linearly to recognition confidence, while source evidence translates to source
confidence responses non-linearly, that is, the translation differs depending on whether
item evidence is low or high. This means that under the CC model, item evidence is used
to set the decision criteria in such a way that as item evidence increases, source
confidence criteria become more tightly grouped, as shown by the dashed lines. In other
words, the source criteria are not fixed; they vary based on item confidence. So, as item

Figure 4. Bivariate Gaussian Model for the Converging Criteria account. The x-axis
represented source evidence, and the y-axis represented item evidence. Source confidence
maps onto item evidence non-linearly as item evidence increases.
7

memories get stronger, and the criteria converge, the likelihood of a high confidence
response increases (Starns and Ksander, 2016). Simply put, item and source confidence
are yoked. When item memory is high, source confidence will also tend to be high.
Seeing that item memory influences source confidence judgements in a way that might
not be fully explained by memory processes alone, rather a decision process like that
described by the CC model, there is a need to better understanding the link between item
memory and source confidence.
1.3 Increased item memory influences source confidence
Previous work has aimed to test decision-based models to determine how item
memory influences source confidence responses (Starns & Ksander, 2016; Starns,
Pazzaglia, Rotello & Hautus, 2013). Item and source stimuli are typically studied
together, meaning that item and source evidence should be equal. However, the source
confidence effect described by the CC model is dependent on item strength, and source
memory changes are not assumed to be necessary for producing the effect. In contrast,
other models predict that changes in source evidence are necessary to explain the source
confidence effect. This means that the CC model makes a unique prediction for a task
paradigm that allows item memory strength to vary, but source evidence to remain static.
Starns and Ksander (2016) investigated the effect of increasing only item memory, but
not source memory in the following way: Participants learned a series of words, each
paired with an image of a male or female face. Some of these stimuli were studied
multiple times. Critically, to ensure that item memory was strengthened without
strengthening source memory, the source that each item was paired with could change.
That is, the word could be studied only once (no repetition condition, or N), studied three
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times with the same source (same source repetition, or SS), or studied with two
completely different sources, such as a female face in one trial, and a bird in the
following instance (difference source repetition, or DS). The DS condition was the
critical manipulation as it allowed for item memory to increase without improving source
memory. Participants were then tasked with rating their confidence that each item was
studied with a male or female face. Figure 4 shows the results of the zROCs from Starns
and Ksander (2016). The leftmost panels present the pure strength curves (meaning that
responses from the same repetition conditions are plotted against one another) and the

Figure 5. zROC results from Experiment 2; Starns and Ksander, 2016. MN = items
presented once with a male face, FN = items presented once with a female face, MDS =
items presented once with a male face after being presented twice with an animal different source repetition, FDS = items presented once with a female face after being
presented twice with an animal – different source repetition, MSS = items presented 3
times with a male face, and FSS = items presented 3 times with a female face.
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rightmost panels present mixed strength curves (where responses from different repetition
conditions are plotted against one another). Additionally, the top panels represent zROC
functions for the different-source condition, while the bottom panels represent functions
for the same-source condition. The axes on all the ROC functions are the same, where the
x-axis shows the proportion of “false alarms” (here, female items called ‘Male’), and the
y-axis shows the proportion of “hits” (here, male items called ‘Male’), with both passed
through the inverse cumulative distribution function for a standard normal distribution,
z(). Since these axes represent evidence in favor of each source, this means that the
diagonal of the function, which has a slope of 1, represents equal evidence for Male and
Female sources. Further, when the slope deviates from 1, it means that one of the sources
tends to have stronger evidence in favor of it. To determine which source is getting
stronger evidence, recall that the standard slope function shows the change in the y-axis
over the change in the x-axis. If lures are plotted on the x-axis, and targets on the y-axis,
and we find a slope greater than 1, that would mean that there is greater source evidence
in favor of the lure source (in this case, Female faces), than for the target source. If,
however, we have a slope less than 1, that would mean that there is greater source
evidence in favor of the target source (in this case, Male faces), than there is for the lure
source.
The rightmost panels of Figure 4 demonstrate a unique pattern of results for the
mixed-strength scenarios. The top right panel shows results for the different-source
condition. This figure plots the confidence ratings for the no-repetition condition against
the experimental difference-source conditions. This reveals a crossover pattern in which
the zROC slopes deviate from 1 in opposite directions. For example, the “MDS-FN”
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function plots the Male different-source condition (MDS) against the Female norepetition (FN) condition. This means that the items in the MDS condition were studied
multiple times, but only seen with the Male face (the target) once. The FN condition
studies the item only once, and with a Female face. The slope below 1 in this condition
indicates that there is generally clearer evidence to identify male items as male than to
identify female items as female. Conversely, the slope above 1 for the other function on
the plot, labeled “MN-FDS” (Male no-repetition (MN) condition plotted against Female
different-source (FDS) condition), indicates that there is generally clearer evidence to
identify female items as female than male items as male.
The idea that source criteria become more tightly grouped under the CC account,
as was introduced with Figure 3, can be thought of as a factor that makes source evidence
less reliable because the converged criteria make participants feel highly confident in a
response even when source evidence doesn’t strongly support it. To put this in context of
the results of Starns and Ksander (2016), the “MDS-FN” condition makes it difficult for
participants to report (or for the experimenter to observe) clear evidence for the female
source. Another way to say this is that high confidence that an item was studied in a
female source is no longer a reliable indication of high accuracy, because it is also
relatively common to feel highly confident when incorrectly calling a male item “female”
based on the high item strength of male items. The same idea applies to the “MN-FDS”
zROC, where this time the high item strength for female items produces a lot a highconfidence source errors and means that high confidence in a “male” response is not a
reliable signal of high accuracy. So, the crossover effect is due to an increased proportion
of repeated items being recognized with high confidence, meaning that their associated
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source judgments are likely to be also issued with high confidence, even when the source
judgments are wrong.
The fact that the crossover effect is due to an increased proportion of repeated
items (leading to more items recognized with high confidence), means that the CC
account predicts that the crossover effect should be observed for the same-source
condition, too. The bottom right panel of Figure 4 shows the mixed-strength zROC for
the same-source condition. The same-source condition has subjects study the same itemsource pairs three times. Contrary to the different-source condition, the same-source
condition increases item memory and source memory together, so source memory should
theoretically be stronger in this case. Despite this difference from the different-source
conditions, the zROC slope show the same pattern: the “MSS-FN” (Male same-source
condition (MSS) and Female no-repetition (FN) condition) function reveals a slope less
than 1, and “MN-FSS” (Male no-repetition (MN) condition and Female same-source
condition (FSS)) function reveals a slope greater than one. Considered as a whole, these
results show that strengthening item memory produces a crossover in zROC slopes
regardless of whether source memory is also strengthened. Because the CC account can
explain the crossover effect for both the different-source and same-source conditions, the
results provide strong evidence in favor of the CC model.
1.4 A novel test of the CC account
The predictions of the CC account could potentially be tested with any other
dataset containing confidence judgements for both recognition and source decisions, and
compared to existing accounts of item memory and source confidence. In the current
study, we compare the CC account to the Fixed Criteria account (hereinafter referred to
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as the FC account), which is explained in greater detail below. The key comparison that
differentiates the CC account from the FC account concerns the proportion of source
errors made with high confidence for high and low item confidence. In other words, we
require experiments in which item confidence is the independent variable with two levels
(high and low). In such studies, we can look at source errors corresponding to both high
item confidence and low item confidence responses. The dependent variable is the
proportion of source errors that are made with high source confidence. Critically, while
we are interested in examining source responses made at high confidence, it is important
to emphasize that we are focusing on high confidence responses made for source errors
only – that is, instances in which a subject chose the wrong source (e.g., selecting Source
B, when it should have been A).
The CC account predicts that there should be some proportion of errors that are
made with high confidence. More of these are expected for trials with high versus low
item confidence because the source criteria converge or “pull-in” toward each other as
item confidence increases, as shown in Figure 5 labeled “Converging Criteria.” The
panels show distributions of source information, for items studied with Source B, when
the corresponding item recognition response was made with low confidence (left; yellow
solid curve), and when the item response was made with high confidence (right; solid
grey curve). Since higher item memory contributes to higher source evidence, the high
confidence item distribution is displayed with a higher mean and is shifted to the right
along the x-axis. Each plot also shows several vertical lines. The solid grey line
represents the source response criterion, that is, the point at which evidence for source A
and source B is equal; we can call this the mid-point. The mid-point on each panel in
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Figure 5 is on the same threshold value along the x-axis. The area of the distribution to
the left of the line corresponds to the proportion of Source A responses, while the area of
the distribution to the right corresponds to the proportion of Source B responses.
Assuming that Source B is the correct response in this example, the left side of the
distributions represent source errors (instances where Source A was selected instead of
source B), so we will focus on the grey hatch patterned regions of these figures where
these source errors are contained. However, the same patterns would also hold true if
Source A were the correct answer. The dashed vertical lines represent our confidence
criteria, where low confidence source judgements are represented in the area between the
mid-point and the yellow dashed line, moderate confidence source judgements between
the yellow dashed line and the gold dashed line, and anything beyond the gold dashed
line represents high confidence source judgements. The proportion of source errors made

Figure 5. Expected source errors under the Converging Criteria (CC) account. The leftmost panel shows the distribution for low item confidence in yellow, and on the right is the
distribution for high item confidence in grey plotted along source evidence (x-axis). The
solid grey vertical bar represents the mid-point of source evidence where everything to the
left represents evidence in favor of Source A and to the right, Source B. The dashed vertical
lines represent confidence criteria, where the gold dashed lines in particular show criterion
placement for high confidence source decisions. The shaded red regions show the expected
proportion of source errors made with high confidence based on item confidence.
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with high confidence is determined by dividing the area under the curve to the left of the
gold dashed line, shaded in red, by the total area under the grey hatched area; that is,
dividing the number of source errors made with high confidence by the total number of
source errors.
Finally, notice that the spread of criteria looks different for high and low item
confidence, respectively: for low confidence item responses, the criteria are widely
spread, and the proportion of source errors made with high confidence (red shaded
region) is minimal. For high item confidence responses, the criteria are much more
tightly bound. The red shaded region is now larger for high item confidence than for low
item confidence, and the total number of source errors is lower for high than low item
confidence. Putting these two changes together, the proportion of source errors made with

Figure 6. Expected source errors under the fixed criteria (FC) account. The left panel
shows the distribution for low item confidence (yellow curve), and the right panel shows
distribution for high item confidence (grey curve) plotted along source evidence (x-axis).
The solid grey vertical bar represents the mid-point of source evidence where everything to
the left represents evidence in favor of Source A and to the right, Source B. The dashed
vertical lines represent confidence criteria, where the gold dashed lines show criterion
placement for high confidence source decisions. The shaded red region under the low item
confidence curve corresponds to source errors made with high confidence. When item
confidence is high, source errors with high confidence are not expected, hence the lack of a
red shaded region on this panel.
15

high confidence is substantially higher for high than low item confidence. The changes in
criterion (widely versus narrowly spaced) represent the amount of evidence a subject
requires to respond with high confidence. With low item confidence, someone would
need a lot more source evidence to make a high confidence response, meaning they
would be more conservative in their response behavior. In the case of high item
confidence, however, the amount of evidence needed to make a high confidence source
response drastically decreases. This means that a subject is much more liberal in their
response behavior and more likely to respond with high confidence since source evidence
is generally more ambiguous.
The CC account’s predictions can be contrasted with the fixed criteria account
(FC account hereafter). The FC account describes what is typically predicted under most
signal detection models for recognition memory. Specifically, it says that we should not
commonly observe source errors for items recognized with high confidence because
increased item memory shifts the entire source memory distribution further to the right
along the x-axis. This scenario is identical to what was described above for the CC
account. The key distinction with the FC account, though, is that as item memory
increases, the decision criteria remain fixed, so item confidence is no longer decreasing
the spread of the decision criteria as it would under the CC account; rather, it changes
only the mean of the distribution. The panels of Figure 6 labeled “Fixed Criteria"
illustrate this. The left panel shows a yellow source evidence distribution for items
recognized with low confidence, and the right panel shows a grey source evidence
distribution for items recognized with high confidence. Note that the criteria for both the
low and high item confidence distributions are the same and the criteria are more
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moderately spaced compared to the CC account. Importantly, we would still expect some
number of source errors made with high confidence to occur in the low item recognition
condition (left panel, Figure 6), but as item confidence increases, the mean of the source
evidence distribution increases, too. This shifts the distribution to the right, increasing
discriminability between Source A and Source B. Consequently, the high confidence
source criterion now lies at the tail of the distribution (right panel, Figure 6). This means
that very few source errors made with high confidence are expected, so this proportion
should be very low. The lack of a red shaded region reflects this. Each of these accounts
make distinct predictions for how memory influences source decisions. As a result, we
can adjudicate between these two models with studies that test the alternative predictions
of the CC and FC accounts; this will enable us to understand how item memory and
source confidence are interacting with each other to produce these source errors made
with high confidence. Results of a study that discriminates the two models’ predictions
could provide evidence to distinguish fundamentally different ideas for the cognitive
processes underlying memory-based decisions.

17

CHAPTER 2
PROJECT AIMS
The present study asks two specific questions. First, we will use computational
models of behavioral data to assess the evidence for the effect predicted by the CC
account. That is, we will determine whether increasing item confidence increases the
proportion of source errors with high confidence, using existing behavioral datasets. To
meet this objective, we need to model response behavior across multiple conditions (high
and low item confidence, high and low confidence source errors, and combinations of the
two). We will use existing data from previous recognition memory experiments that
follow similar paradigms and meet several criteria that are explained below. These data
will be analyzed using a hierarchical Bayesian model to predict the expected proportion
of source errors with high confidence across levels of item confidence.
Our second question tests a second prediction common to both the CC and FC
accounts, namely whether source accuracy (as a proxy for source memory strength) also
influences the proportion of source errors made with high confidence. Up to this point,
we have focused on item memory being the independent variable that affects source
errors. However, source accuracy, as a proxy for source memory strength, should also be
related to the proportion of source errors made with high confidence. That is, for high
source accuracy items (which have high source memory strength), the distributions of
source memory shifts further from zero. If the criteria remain stable, then this should
result in a lower proportion of high confidence responses for source errors in the case of
high source accuracy items (see Figure 6). We should expect that people use fairly
consistent criteria for source judgements when they are making the same item confidence
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judgment. That means that if we restrict the analysis to only high item confidence
responses, we can “simulate” stable source criteria that are central to the FC account’s
predictions. To make this clear, restricting to just high item confidence responses is
equivalent to taking only trials contained in the top level of Figure 3, where source
criteria are most tightly grouped. Consequently, any changes in response behavior, like
the proportion of source errors, will likely be due to changes in the source memory
distributions themselves, rather than changes in the decision criteria.
Assuming that the FC model holds, the source accuracy effect should be very
similar to the item confidence effect. That is, high item confidence is associated with
higher source strength, and the same source confidence criteria are applied for high and
low item confidence (Figure 4). Assuming that the CC model holds, the source accuracy
and item confidence effects should be quite different, because changing source criteria
play a much bigger role in the latter effect. If we find that the proportion of source errors
made with high source confidence decreases as source accuracy increases but increases
from low to high item confidence, this would strengthen the case that the changing
criteria play a role in producing the item confidence effect because when they are held
constant, the effect goes the other way. This would support Aim 1 of this study. This
second question will focus on data from experiments that manipulated source memory
strength. Overall, in carrying out these two goals we will also check for consistency
across data sets, ensuring that the effects generalize across the different studies and
samples, demonstrating the robustness of our findings.
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CHAPTER 3
MATERIALS AND METHODS
3.1 Experiment Eligibility
To address the questions above, we used existing data from a number of
recognition memory experiments. Datasets were readily available online, or were
acquired from the authors directly. In order to be eligible for inclusion in the present
study, each experimental paradigm and their respective behavioral datafiles needed to
meet a number of criteria. Experiments that did not meet these criteria were not included
in the analysis.
3.1.1 Encoding
Participants first needed to complete an encoding task where they would learn the
stimuli they would be tested on later. During each block of encoding, a series of itemsource pairs are presented so they could be studied. Some experiments may have included
an implicit source encoding scheme, or an item strength manipulation during encoding.
While an item (and source) strength manipulation was not necessary to address the
primary research question in this study (because we can use item confidence as a proxy
for an item strength difference), these studies were still included because they allow us to
explore additional questions related to changes in item memory strength. The way that
the manipulation of item strength was carried out could vary across experiments, but
generally resulted in two levels of item strength: weak and strong.
3.1.2 Recognition memory and confidence
In addition to an encoding task, the paradigm also needed to include a few
memory tests in which participants had the opportunity to make judgements of their
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learning for the item and source. One of these tests is a recognition memory test for all
the items that were studied at encoding. This test required that each of the items from the
encoding task was presented, along with a subset of never-before studied items (lures)
that participants would make recognition and confidence judgements for. In the studies
included in the present analysis, participants used the keyboard to indicate whether each
word was previously studied (old), or never seen before (new) while simultaneously
indicating their confidence in that response. In the studies included here, responses were
made using a 6-point scale, where “1” could be definitely old and “6” definitely new, for
example. This procedure was applied to all test stimuli, such that all target (studied items)
and lure items received a recognition judgement. Performance feedback was allowed, but
not required. In the studies that did provide feedback, it was given at the end of each
block and reflected overall recognition accuracy. Some studies had different feedback
procedures, and chose to only provide reaction time feedback to encourage responses
being made within the allotted timeframe.
3.1.3 Source memory and confidence judgements
Additionally, there was a second memory test, but for all sources from the
encoding phase. For each item, participants needed to make a source judgement whereby
they indicated which source a given item had been studied with and their confidence in
that response. Again, the source options varied slightly depending on the study so we will
refer to the source options as source A and source B. Source judgements were made for
all targets, and could be made for any lure items to which the participant false alarmed
(responded “old”). All other items did not receive a source judgement. Thus, the number
of trials in each source confidence task could vary depending on how many lures were
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included. In each eligible study, a similar 6-point scale was used, where “1” was
definitely source A, and “6” was definitely source B. The procedure was repeated until all
items received a source judgement.
Importantly, we imposed no constraints on the order in which item and source
judgements needed to be made. Typically, a block of item judgements is done first, and a
block of source judgements for all corresponding items follows. However, this does not
need to be the case. Table 1 below outlines some of the key differences across the
experiments that were included in the current study. Those from Fox and Osth (2021) are
examples in which task order was manipulated. This resulted in three different
procedures. “Blocked” procedures were those where, as described above, the item
judgements precede source judgements. “Reversed” procedures are those where the
source judgements precede the item judgements. “Simultaneous” procedures are different
from both the aforementioned procedures in that it is not blocked – item and source
judgements alternate on a trial-by-trial basis. That is, an item judgement is made, and the
corresponding source judgement for that item is made immediately after. A single trial
can be thought of as being comprised of an item and source judgement, so the next trial
doesn’t begin until a new item judgement is made.
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CHAPTER 4
DATA
Following the eligibility criteria above, we gathered data from 4 studies – from
which, 12 separate experiments were included in the final analyses. Those are: 3
experiments from Starns & Ksander, 2016, 3 experiments from Starns & Pazzaglia, 2013,
4 experiments from Fox and Osth, 2021, and 2 unpublished datasets (labeled Sanders et
al., 2021). Table 1 notes key differences across each of the experiments that were
included in the analysis. Source stimuli was the most variable feature, ranging from
voices, faces, scenes, and screen position. Most experiments included a strength
manipulation, but Fox and Osth (2021) was the exception. This study also did not provide
feedback relative for their recognition performance at the end of each block, instead
giving feedback on reaction time to ensure that responses were not made too fast, nor too
slow.
4.1 Analysis
4.1.1 Data preprocessing
Data from all experiments were re-coded to the same format, and were inspected
for completeness; that is, a subject needed to have data for both a recognition task and
source recall task, and have completed every block of each phase of the experiment.
Subjects who did not complete one of the two tasks, or only had partial data for either or
both tasks were excluded from analysis. Once a final subject list was compiled, the raw
data were transformed into a format appropriate for the hierarchical model. This meant
using the recognition data and source data to quantify each type of response per subject.
The proportion of source errors made with high confidence is our dependent variable,
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Item
Stimuli

Source Stimuli

strength
Manipulation

Feedback

Notes

Pazzaglia et. al., 2013
Experiment 1**

Words

Female/Male
Voice

Y

Y – source
accuracy

Blocked

Experiment 2**

Words

Female/Male
Voice

Y

Y – source
accuracy

Blocked

Experiment 3**

Words

Female/Male
Voice

Y

Y – source
accuracy

Blocked

Starns and Ksander, 2016
Experiment 1**

Words

Female/Male
Faces

Y

Y – source
accuracy

Blocked

Experiment 2.1

Words

Female/Male
Faces

Y

Y – source
accuracy

Blocked

Experiment 2.2

Words

Bird/Fish image

N

Different-source
repetition stimuli

Sanders et. al., 2022
Experiment 1

Words

Face/scene
image

Y

Y – source
accuracy

Blocked

Experiment 2

Words

Face/scene
Image

Y

Y – source
accuracy

Blocked

Fox and Osth, 2021
Experiment 1a

Words

Screen position

N

Y – reaction
time

Blocked

Experiment 1b

Words

Screen position

N

Y – reaction
time

Simultaneous

Experiment 1c

Words

Screen position

N

Y – reaction
time

Reversed

Experiment 3a

Words

Screen position

N

Y – reaction
time

Simultaneous

Table 1. List of datasets included in analysis. For each dataset included in analysis, key attributes
are detailed above. The item stimulus, source stimulus, whether an item manipulation is present,
whether feedback is offer and how, and additional comments are included to differentiate each
study. Only those experiments marked with asterisks were used in Aim 2 of this study.
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and we are conditionalizing by item confidence. This resulted in a new table that contains
the total number of source errors made with high confidence and low confidence, for
items recognized with both high and low confidence. For example, one table contained
the proportion of source errors made with high confidence when item recognition was
low, and another when item recognition was high. To explore additional questions, these
tables were further separated by item strength. That is, source errors for items that were
studied once versus source errors for items that were studied multiple times. For example,
one table could contain the proportion of source errors made with high confidence when
item recognition was high, and item strength was low.
4.1.2 Bayesian hierarchical approach
To test predictions made by the converging criteria (CC) account and the fixed
criteria (FC) account, we used a Bayesian Hierarchical approach. At a high level,
Bayesian reasoning involves updating a belief system as new evidence becomes
available. This approach uses probability distributions to obtain representations of
uncertainty for each relevant parameter in a model (Dennis, Lee & Kinnel, 2008). By
repeatedly sampling from these distributions (and repeatedly updating these distributions
with new evidence) we generate posterior distributions that allow us to estimate source
errors, correct source judgements, and confidence responses.
All models were implemented using JAGS for R, which uses Markov Chain
Monte Carlo to sample from prior probability distributions (Denwood, 2016). To evaluate
our primary research question, we need to understand how the proportion of source errors
made with high confidence changes as a function of item confidence (referred to as the
Item Confidence Effect, ICE). Figure 7 provides a schematic that describes one way in
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which information flows in the model in order to estimate the ICE. We begin with a
number of priors on parameters that characterize across-participant distributions. There
are represented by normal distributions whose means and precisions are provided in
Table 2.

Table 2. Parameters informing priors across all participants. Shown are the means,
precision, and values in which a distributions is truncated. All values are loosely
informed on prior research on source memory.
The parameters shown in Table 2 are the only constraints on the model that were
imposed – all other estimates were informed by the data itself. These priors inform the
means and standard deviations for our ICE and intercept priors on individual participants
(second column in Figure 7). That means that each participant gets an estimated
probability of making a high confidence source response (intercept), and an estimate that
describes the way they make these high confidence source judgements based in their item
confidence (ICE). Each of these prior distributions can be used to generate a probability
value that represents each participant’s probability of making a high confidence source
judgement given that item confidence is either high or low. This is given by adding
(subtracting) half of the ICE parameter from the intercept parameter when item
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confidence is high (low). Finally, once these probability values are calculated, this value,
and the total number of source errors each participant made at a given level of item
confidence is used to build a Bernoulli distribution of source errors for high and low item
confidence, as shown in the final column of Figure 7.

Figure 7. Bayesian model of source errors for item confidence. Priors across participants
were defined as normal distributions that inform the means and standard deviations for
estimates of the ICE and intercept (priors on individual participants). Each of these
estimates is continually updated as more data becomes available – this occurs at the
individual participant level, the dataset level, and across all datasets to get an overall effect.
As described above, these distributions are repeatedly updated as new information
becomes available and occurs simultaneously. The process described in the previous
paragraphs can be thought of describing information flow for a single participant. That
means that as new subjects are added to the analysis, all of the priors get updated to
account for the new data. As new aggregations are made, our priors get continually
updated, and our certainty in the estimates generated improves. We can average these
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ICE and intercept estimates across participants and group by dataset to understand how
these parameters vary by study, and we can average across studies to get an overall
effect. This means that we will end up with three levels for each of our parameters; one at
the participant level, another at the dataset level, and finally, and overall effect. For our
analyses, we focus on the latter two levels.
We also applied a model to estimate source accuracy. The model here is
structured in a very similar fashion to the Source Error Model described above. We first
initiate a series of priors across participants that inform the means and standard
deviations for our priors on individual participants. The latter priors represent source d’
distributions (which we are using as a proxy for source accuracy) for low item confidence
and high item confidence. These d’ estimates are used to calculate a probability value
that represents each participant’s probability of making a correct source judgement when
item confidence is either high or low. Finally, these probability values are used as one
parameter, alongside the total number of correct source judgements at high and low item
confidence, and is used to build a Bernoulli distribution of correct source responses.
Source d’ for low and high item confidence are the primary posteriors we are interested
in for the source accuracy model.
The advantage of using this model over others is that it can generate estimates
even when limited data are available. This is, we can still get an estimate for the
proportion of source errors made with high confidence even for participants who made
few or no source errors, and we can still get estimates of d’ when few or no correct
judgements were made with low item confidence. When cases like these arise, the
hierarchical Bayes model generalizes, using the results from all other subjects to estimate

28

the probability of making a high confidence response for that subject. This means that
each level of the model (overall uncertainty of a response, subject, study, etc.) is working
to inform that last level, to ultimately provide reasonable estimates of source errors. This
structure is what makes the model hierarchical because each level depends on one
another.
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CHAPTER 5
PREDICTED MODEL OUTCOMES
Under the FC model, when item confidence shifts from low to high, the
distributions of source memory strength move farther from zero with no change in source
criteria, so we should expect the proportion of source errors made with high confidence
to be lower for high than low item confidence (right panel in Figure 5; this is why there is
no red shaded region beyond the gold dashed line). The CC model, on the other hand,
says that the criteria should "pull-in" or converge, moving from low to high confidence,
making it more likely that a participant will make a high confidence source error,
therefore increasing the area under the curve (right panel in Figure 6; area past the gold
dashed line is now filled, showing that source errors are now being made).
Each of the models here – the FC and CC accounts – make distinct predictions for
how source errors change as a function of item confidence. We can use these predictions
to define a metric that will allow us to easily detect changes in the proportion of source
errors made with high confidence; that is, whether it is increasing or decreasing as item
confidence increases. Our Bayesian model provides two posterior distributions for source
errors: one that shows the distribution of estimated source errors made with high
confidence when item confidence was high, and another for when item confidence was
low. Subtracting the posterior distribution representing high item confidence from the
posterior distribution representing low confidence yields a new distribution that shows
the change in source errors made with high confidence as item confidence increases. We
call this metric the item confidence effect, or ICE. Using the mean of the ICE
distribution, we can determine whether the proportion of source errors made with high
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confidence favors the CC model, or the FC model. When the ICE is positive, the number
of high confidence source errors was higher for high confidence item responses than for
low confidence item responses; such evidence would support the CC account because the
proportion of source errors is increasing given the positive mean. However, if the ICE is
negative, then high confidence source errors were more common for low confidence item
responses than for high confidence item responses. This would support the FC account
because the proportion of source errors is decreasing as item confidence increases given
the negative mean.
The FC account can also be tested in other ways. The second aim asks whether
the change in source accuracy from low to high confidence is related to the observed
proportion of the source errors made with high confidence. We can explore this question
by looking at studies that had an explicit source strength manipulation. Importantly, we
condition on high-confidence recognition for correct source judgements. Source criteria
for the weakly encoded sources and strongly encoded sources should generally be the
same. Because the decision criteria are not expected to change when looking at only high
confidence item judgements, we may expect that higher source accuracy reduces the
proportion of source errors that are rated as high confidence. In other words, we may see
a lower proportion of source errors for strong source items than weak source items.
Seeing this reduced effect would be evidence in favor of the FC account.
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CHAPTER 6
RESULTS
6.1 Item confidence changes probability of high source confidence
Before addressing the primary aim of this study and looking into source errors
made with high confidence, we wanted to first understand what patterns of source
confidence responses existed in our data. Our model provides estimates of the overall
probability of a participant making a high confidence source judgement irrespective of
item confidence – we call this the intercept. We can look at these posterior distributions
to understand the ways in which the probability of indicating high confidence changes in
different conditions. We looked at high source confidence for trials in which the
participant got the source correct, and cases where the source was incorrect, and then
conditionalized on item confidence – either low or high.

Figure 8. Mean intercepts of the log odds of a high confidence source judgment for
source correct judgements when item confidence is low (left panel), and high (right
panel). The intercept represents the probability of making a high confidence source
judgement, and is scaled in log odds on the x-axis. The median log odds intercept is
converted to a probability on each panel.
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First, we looked at the intercept for correct source responses – that is, how does
the probability of making a high confidence source judgement change from low to high
item confidence when the participant is getting the source correct. Figure 8 shows the
posterior distribution for the intercept at low item confidence (on the left panel) and high
item confidence (on the right panel). The x-axis of the histogram shows the mean
intercept values in log odds, and the y-axis shows the frequency with which that estimate
was sampled in the model. Since the x-axis represents the intercepts in log odds, we’ve
taken the median value and included a reference value in probability space for ease of
interpretation. The plots show that the probability of indicating high confidence increases
as item confidence increases when the source is correctly recalled – where the probability
of saying high source confidence when item confidence is low is just 19% and this jumps
to 63% when item confidence is high. This result falls in line with what we would expect
for correct source responses. As their source accuracy increases, we should see an
increase in their source confidence as well. After all, participants are recalling the correct
source so it follows that they are more likely to report high confidence since they have
the evidence in memory to support the choice.
We then looked at the same posterior distributions, but for cases when the source
was incorrectly recalled. Figure 9 shows the resulting distributions where the left panel
shows the mean intercept for low item confidence, and the right panel shows the mean
intercept for high item confidence. The x-axis shows the intercepts in log odds. The
median of each distribution was taken and a reference value in probability space is
provided on each plot below (See Appendix Figure 1 for mean intercept posteriors by
dataset). A similar pattern to that observed Figure 8 (where the source was correctly
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recalled) in seen here. That is, the probability of reporting high confidence on the source
judgement again increases as item confidence increases, even when the source is
incorrectly recalled. The difference in the probability of reporting high confidence isn’t
as strong now; it is 10% probable when item confidence is low, increasing to 31%
probability when item confidence is high – a 21% increase. These two results means that
high confidence source responses are more probable as item confidence increases,
notwithstanding source accuracy. To further explore this pattern, the following section
evaluates posterior distributions for the difference between high and low item confidence.

Figure 9. Mean intercepts of the log odds of a high confidence source judgment for
source incorrect judgements when item confidence is low (left panel), and high (right
panel). The intercept represents the probability of making a high confidence source
judgement, and is scaled in log odds on the x-axis. The median log odds intercept is
converted to a probability on each panel.
6.2 High confidence source errors increase with item confidence
To directly evaluate the predictions of the FC and CC account, we can form
posterior distributions of the Item Confidence Effect (ICE). The ICE is a metric that tells
us how the proportion of high confidence responses for source errors changes as item
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confidence increases. To answer this question, we first looked at how the proportion of
correct source responses made with high confidence changed as item confidence
increases. Using the same Bayesian model, we used the total number of high and low
item confidence judgements, as well as the total number of high confidence source
judgements made when item confidence was low and when it was high to estimate the
ICE for correct source judgments. We expected that the proportion of correct source
judgements made with high confidence should be greater when item confidence is high
since there is more evidence in memory to support the correct response. This means that
the mean of the ICE should be positive because the proportion of correct judgements is
greater when item confidence is high. Figure 10 shows the ICE for correct source
judgements. The x-axis represents the estimates of the ICE effect in log odds, and the yaxis represents the frequency with which each value was sampled in the model. The mean

Figure 10. Overall Item Confidence Effect (ICE) for correct source judgements. The mean
of the distribution is positive, which indicates an increase in the proportion of correct source
judgements made with high confidence. The median is represented by the black vertical line.
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of the histogram shows a positive mean, as predicted, with a median estimate of 1.99 and
a 95% CrI of 1.553 to 2.35 meaning that a greater proportion of correct source
judgements are made with high confidence as item confidence increases.
Repeating this analysis with source errors allows us to test our main question, and
contrast the predictions of the CC and FC accounts using the ICE as a metric again. If the
CC account is correct, then we should see a positive mean in the posterior distribution for
the ICE – this would mean that the proportion of source errors made with high
confidence is greater when item confidence is high than when item confidence is low,
because the decision criteria pull in towards each other as item confidence increases.
Because the FC account assumes that the criteria are fixed, when item confidence
increases, you should expect a decrease in the proportion of source errors made with high
confidence. If this account is true, then the model should produce a posterior distributions

Figure 11. Overall Item Confidence Effect (ICE) for incorrect source judgements. The
mean of the distribution is positive, which indicates an increase in the proportion on source
errors made with high confidence. The median is represented by the black vertical line.
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showing the ICE with a negative mean. This would mean that the proportion of source
errors made with high confidence is greater when item confidence is low, than it is when
item confidence is high.
Figure 11 shows the posterior distribution for the ICE for source errors (to see
posterior by dataset, see Appendix Figure 2). On the x-axis are the models estimates of
the ICE in log odds, and the y-axis shows the frequency with which each estimate was
sampled. The mean of the distribution is positive, with a median estimate of 1.38 and a
95% CrI of 1.021 to 1.679. This is consistent with the predictions of the CC account as
source errors made with high confidence are occurring more frequently when item
confidence is high – a pattern that would not be observed under the FC account.
6.3 Item confidence and source discriminability
An important aspect of item memory is that it is closely related to source evidence
– we see this in our predictions (see figures 5 and 6 above), where distributions
representing high item confidence are shown to have greater means along the x-axis of
source evidence. The implication of this is that as item memory increases, the
distributions should be getting more discriminable; thus, moving further apart. The same
is true as source accuracy increases. D' is a measure that quantifies the distance between
the peaks of two distributions. Applied to signal detection models, d' tells us how
discriminable two distributions of source evidence are from one another. To confirm that
the discriminability of the sources increases with item confidence, we can model the
expected d' using our Bayesian model for source accuracy. The difference now is that
rather than estimating source errors made with high confidence, the posteriors represent
d’ for correct source judgements made when item confidence was high and when item
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confidence was low. Figure 12 below shows the posterior distributions for source d’ on
the x-axis and the frequency with which each estimate was sampled on the y-axis. The
left panel shows d’ for low item confidence and the right panel shows d’ for the high item
confidence. When item confidence is low, d’ is estimated to be 0.39, but increases to 1.37
when item confidence is high – meaning that source information is becoming more
discriminable as item confidence increases.

Figure 12. D' estimates for low item confidence (left panel) and high item
confidence (right panel). Median estimates are represented by the black vertical.
In the previous section, we saw a strong ICE effect, but also see in these results
that source d’ is increasing with item confidence. This means that the source evidence
distributions are moving further apart from one another, so source evidence should be
getting more reliable, but the proportion of source errors continues to increase despite
this. The following analysis was conducted to synthesize these two results and
demonstrate how effect that the converging criteria effect that the CC account describes
leads to the increase in source errors despite increased source discriminability. First, we
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quantified the change in d’ from low to high item confidence by subtracting the median
estimates each level of item confidence from one another. This resulted in what we call
delta d’ and a value was calculated for each participant. We then correlated these delta d’
values to each participant’s ICE estimate, and plotted the results in a scatter plot, along
with its slope to show the linear relationship between these factors. Figure 13 shows that
delta d’ and ICE are moderately correlated, r(648) = 0.324, p < 0.05 and have a positive
relationship; meaning that the proportion of source errors made with high confidence is
increasing as discriminability (d’) increases. As item confidence and source
discriminability increase, the criteria simultaneously converge, working against any
effect that d’ may have on source accuracy. In other words, the changing criteria effect is
stronger than the d’ effect. Based on the CC account, this is why the proportion of source
errors made with high confidence increases, and why we still see a positive ICE despite
d’ increasing with item confidence.

Figure 13. Scatter plot showing the relationship between delta d' - the change the
d' from low to high item confidence, and ICE estimates.
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6.4 Source strength effect and high item confidence
The second aim of this project was to understand the effect of source accuracy on
source errors made with high confidence. We test this aim by conditionalizing on high
confidence recognition only – doing so allows us to control for item confidence so that
the decision criteria remain as stable as possible in order to test the predictions of the FC
account. We hypothesized that if the proportion of source errors made with high source
confidence decreases as source accuracy increases, but increases from low to high item
confidence, this would strengthen the case that the changing criteria play a role in
producing the item confidence effect because when the criteria are held stable, the source
accuracy affect would be negative (or decreasing).

Figure 14. Posterior distribution showing the source strength effect for high
confidence recognition judgements. Similar to the ICE, this shows the change in the
proportion of source errors when item strength icnreases from weak to strong. We see a
positive strength effect.
Figure 14 shows the source strength effect for incorrect source judgements when
conditionalized on high item confidence recognition. The posterior distribution shows a
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positive strength effect 0.290 and a 95% CrI of 0.119 to 0.477. This means that even
among high confidence recognition judgements, increasing source strength still increases
the proportion of source errors made with high confidence, just as was found with the
ICE. The same effect is found amongst correct source judgements (Figure 3 in the
Appendix) – we see a positive source strength effect of 0.663. These results do not
support our hypothesis, and contradict the predictions of both the CC account and the FC
account as implemented in Figure 6 (right panel), which has fixed source criteria for all
items that received a high confidence item response. If conditionalizing on high item
confidence does promote stable decision criteria, then we should have seen a decrease in
the proportion of source errors, or a negative strength effect. Results show a positive
strength effect, meaning that the proportion of source errors made with high confidence is
still increasing.
In addition to the analysis on source strength effect for high item confidence, we
also completed analyses on source discriminability and intercept to understand how
changes to source memory influence source confidence judgements across these factors.
Figure 15 shows the posterior distributions representing the intercepts for high item
recognition judgements when the source was incorrectly recalled. The x-axis shows the
mean intercept estimate in log odds. The left panel shows the intercept for weakly
encoding items (item strength is low), where the median estimate is 36% when
transformed in probability space from log odds, and the right panel shows the intercept
for strongly encoded items (item strength is high), where the median estimate is 43%.
This change in the intercepts represents a 7% increase in the probability of making a high
confidence source judgment when source strength increases. Though, this effect for
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source strength is much weaker than the intercepts observed when the analysis is done on
item confidence (see Figure 8). Intercepts for source strength effects for source correct
judgements also increase, such that making a high confidence source judgement is 11%
more probable when source strength is strong (see Figure 4 in the Appendix). Increased
probability of making a high confidence source judgement is not uniquely predicted by
the CC or FC accounts. Thus, on its own, this result does not yield evidence in favor of
the FC account because increased item strength should increase source strength too,
making the probability of a high confidence source judgement greater. What is interesting
though, is that the item strength effect, which is the result of an explicit manipulation to
item evidence in memory, is weaker than the item confidence effect, an internal
judgement of that same evidence.

Figure 15. Posterior distribution showing mean intercepts for high confidence
recognition judgements. The left panel shows posterioir intercepts for weakly encoded
sources, and the right panel shows posteriors for strongly encoded source. Intercepts
represent the probability of making a high confidence source judgment. As source
strength increases, the probabilty of making a high confidence source judgement
increases.
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Finally, we applied our source accuracy model to get estimates of d’ to understand
how source discriminability is changing as source strength increases for items recognized
with high confidence. Results of this analysis show that source information becomes
more discriminable as source strength increases, such that d’ for weakly encoded sources
is 2.08, and increases to 2.62 for strongly encoded sources. Since these trials are
restricted to those where item confidence was high, we can use these d’ estimates to
visualize the change in the proportion of source errors made with high confidence as d’
increases. Figure 16 shows the correlation between delta d’, which is the difference in d’
estimates from strong to weak source strength on the y-axis (posterior distributions
showing source strength effects of d’ are shown in Figure 5 of the appendix), and all

Figure 16. Scatter plot showing the relationship between delta d' - the change the d'
from strong to weak source strength shown on the y-axis, and source strength effect
estimates on the x-axis. Source strength effects represented the change in the proportion
of source errors made with high confidence as source strength increases. The plot shows
a moderately negative correlation.
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median source strength effect estimates on the x-axis. A moderate negative correlation is
observed, r(191) = -0.53, p < 0.05 meaning when you restrict the analysis to high
confidence recognition items, which is assumed to keep decision criteria stable (like in
the FC account), the strength effect on the proportion of source errors made with high
confidence decreases as the strength effect on d’ increases. In other words, although
increasing source strength unexpectedly produced an increase in high confidence source
responding for errors, this increase tended to be smaller for participants who had larger
effects of source strength on source discriminability. Thus, it is possible that even larger
changes in source discriminability would produce the expected decrease in high
confidence source responding, but that remains speculative at this point.
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CHAPTER 7
DISCUSSION
The analyses presented above had the goal of understanding the relationship
between item memory and source confidence by exploring source errors made with high
confidence in recognition memory tasks. We contrasted two signal-detection based
models: the fixed criteria (FC) account, and the converging criteria (CC) account – each
of which makes a distinct prediction for how the proportion of source errors made with
high confidence should change as item memory increases. The FC account argues that
confidence criteria are fixed across levels of item confidence; the implication being that
as item confidence increases, source errors made with high confidence should not be
expected to occur, or should occur very rarely because the increased item confidence
boosts source discriminability. If source discriminability is high, source errors should not
occur often, and should not be typically associated with high confidence because there is
strong evidence in memory to support a correct source judgement. The CC account, on
the other hand, predicts a surge in source errors made with high confidence. This model
not only posits that confidence criteria can move across levels of item confidence, but
that they converge on each other the higher item confidence is. When this happens, the
proportion of source errors made with high confidence actually increases because the
moving criteria work against any effect higher source discriminability may have on
confidence. Using data from existing recognition/source memory experiments, we
contrasted these two accounts using a Bayesian Hierarchical model to estimate how the
proportion of source errors made with high confidence changes as a function of item
confidence. This value was defined as the Item Confidence Effect, or ICE.
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Results of the experiment support the predictions of the CC model; that is, the
proportion of source errors made with high confidence increases as item confidence
increases, given by the positive median of the ICE posteriors. We found that the overall
probability of making a high confidence source judgment increases as item confidence
increases, and, importantly, modeling d’ as a function of item confidence showed that
sources do become more discriminable as item confidence increases, too. The fact that d’
is increasing but we are still seeing an increase in the proportion of source errors made
with high confidence is explained by the converging criteria account. The FC account
predicts the proportion of high confidence responses for source errors to decrease as d’
increases because source evidence shifts the distributions further away from one another,
while the decision criteria remain fixed. This would make it very unlikely that
participants would make source errors, especially with high confidence (see Figure 6).
However, with dynamic decision criteria that pull in on one another as the distributions
shift apart, it becomes more likely that a source error with high confidence will occur
because source and confidence evidence are easily obscured. This means that the effect of
a high d’, which should increase source accuracy, is no longer what it is expected because
the converging criteria work to minimize it. One way to think about this effect is by
imagining what happens when you link two rubber bands together. Let each rubber band
represent a source distribution, and the center loop represent the spread of the decision
criteria. Before you pull on the rubber bands, the center loop is loose. This means that the
decision criteria are moderately spread when d’ is low, or when the bands haven’t been
stretched yet. However, as you begin the pull on the rubber bands, center loop gets
tighter, eventually forming a tight knot that’s difficult to untangle. In other words, the
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consequence of pulling these distributions further apart is that the decision criteria
simultaneously move closer together. When the criteria are so close, it becomes difficult
to parse evidence stored in memory to make appropriate source confidence judgements.
This is one explanation for why feelings of high confidence may not always be reliable,
because true evidence may not support it.
Further, we replicated these analyses looking at the effect of memory strength on
the proportion on source errors made with high confidence. Critically, this was also
restricted to only high confidence recognition trials. This was done in order to control for
the effect of strength on source confidence – with item recognition at one level,
participants should be using similar decision criteria to make their responses. This means
that decision criteria are held constant; a factor that mimics the FC account’s framework,
and was used to test this account in this study. We found that correlating the source
strength effects with the change in d’ from weak to strong source strength yields a
negative correlation. This means that when source discriminability is low, the proportion
of source errors made with high confidence is high. As discriminability increases, this
strength effect weakens and we see a decrease in source errors. In other words, when
there isn’t enough evidence in memory to make a correct source judgement, more source
errors are going to be made, assuming that decision criteria are not changing. However,
as source evidence increases, fewer source errors are made because there is sufficient
evidence to support a correct judgement. Based on the FC account, the proportion of
source errors should be decreasing when decision criteria are stable because the only
factor influencing source confidence is source evidence. That means that these
distributions should be moving further from zero (a change represented by an increase in
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d’). We also found a positive source strength effect (Figure 14), showing that the
proportion of source errors made with high confidence is greater when source strength is
high. Although the source strength effect is significantly weaker than the item confidence
effect (median estimates of 0.2 and 1.5, respectively), this finding still counters what was
originally predicted – a negative item strength effect. Finding a positive strength effect
could mean that decision criteria actually are changing but in a continuous (rather than
discrete) fashion (Starns and Pazzaglia, 2013), or suggest that other factors or heuristics
may still be influencing source confidence judgements just as well.
While results suggest that the CC account is a strong model that can explain the
number of source errors made with high confidence, there exist alternative decision
heuristics that may be able to explain them just as well. Klauer and Kellen (2011)
introduce the principal of consistency that could produce the same pattern of behavior.
This account argues that participants are more inclined to make a high confidence source
judgment if they made a high confidence item judgment simply because the confidence
should “match.” If each stimulus pair is presented at the same time, and encoded as a
pair, then it would not make much sense to be highly confident in your judgement of the
item, and not very confident in your judgment of the source, when they were learned
together; you should be either highly confident in item and source, or very unsure of item
and source. If this is a heuristic that participants adopt in these tasks, it could produce the
same pattern of results where we see a surplus of source errors made with high
confidence because they are intentionally yoking their confidence responses. This
alternative could explain the posterior ICE distribution for one of the datasets used in this
present study. Fox and Osth (2021) experiment 3a used a slightly different task paradigm
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Figure 17. Fox and Osth (2021) posterior distribution for the ICE for experiment
1a. In this experiment, source confidence judgments preceded item confidence
judgements. A positive ICE is still observed.
from the rest of their experiments – and from the others included in this study. In this
experiment, participants were asked to make their source confidence judgements first,
and then the item confidence judgements would follow. In all other studies, the item
confidence judgement was always made first – but this particular experiment allowed us
test a new condition under which the CC may hold. Based on the median of the posterior
distribution shown in Figure 17 the ICE is positive; this suggests that the proportion of
source errors made with high confidence is increasing with greater item confidence. This
is the same pattern of results that provided evidence in support of the CC account across
all datasets, and it holds consistent even when item confidence is judged after source
confidence.
The effect of the principle of consistency could produce this because it would
make the same argument that the CC account makes, with the stimulus judgements
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reversed. In other words, a high confidence item judgment is more likely if the participant
is highly confident in the source they think it was studied with. No matter the order in
which the judgments are made, if high confidence is attributed to one stimulus (say, the
source), it will be attributed to the other stimulus as well (like the item) leading to a
positive ICE. This finding in the Fox and Osth (2021) experiment has another important
implication however – it provides evidence that item memory is contributing to the
criterion shift in the CC account, and is not just a side-effect of indicating high item
confidence. Had this been the case, we would not see a positive ICE in this distribution
source errors with high confidence would not be changing as a function of item
confidence. However, since we do see this effect, irrespective of whether the item
confidence judgement was made first or last, we can be more confident that it is evidence
for the item stored in memory that mediates the converging criteria effect.

Figure 18. Matrix shows the probability of making a high confidence source
judgement across levels of source accuracy and item confidence.
Interestingly, an unexpected pattern emerges upon observing the probabilities of
reporting high confidence for a source judgement (the intercept). The grid in Figure 18
shows the intercepts across correct and incorrect source judgements, when item
confidence is high and low. As item confidence increases (moving from right to left) the
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probability of making a high confidence source judgement increases. Similarly, the
probability of making a high confidence source judgement is greater when source
responses are correct, rather than incorrect. These patterns reflect the results that are
reported in the intercept analyses presented in Figures 8 and 9, and agree with we know
about accuracy in recognition and its relationship to confidence. The interesting pattern
emerges when you look at the diagonal of the grid. The probability of making a high
confidence source judgement when you are incorrect about the source but have high item
confidence is 32%. However, this probability is reduced to only 19% when you are
correct about the source but have low item confidence. Even when you have evidence in
memory to support a correct source judgement (that you should be highly confident in)
you are still more likely to make that high confidence judgement when you don’t have
sufficient source evidence in memory, instead. The effect of item confidence on source
confidence is strong, apparently stronger than the effect of actually retrieving the source
details correctly.
While this study yields important evidence in favor of the converging criteria
model, there is still more work that needs to be done to understand why this model works
and why source evidence is “bypassed” when making a source confidence judgement. In
other words, if source evidence is just becoming increasingly variable as item confidence
increases, and it is not the result of a decision heuristic like the CC account, then we need
further work to discriminate between these two possibilities – a question that cannot be
answered with behavioral data alone. Future work can use neuroimaging methods to
determine whether source information is actually being recalled, or if high confidence
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decisions are just being used more liberally. Examining these sorts of representations in
the brain may also offer some insight into the mechanisms that supports the CC account.
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APPENDIX

Figure A1. Posterior distributions for overall mean intercept by dataset. Intercept
estimates are collapsed across levels of item confidence.
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Figure A2. Posterior distributions for Mean ICE by dataset.
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Figure A3. Item strength effects for high item confidence recognition for correct source
judgements. A positive item strength effect of observed.
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Figure A4. Mean intercepts for correct source judgements for weak items (on the left panel)
and strong items (on the right panel). The x-axis shows intercepts in log odds, and a median
estimate in probability space in included for reference.

Figure A5. D’ estimates for weak items (on the left panel) and strong items (on the right
panel) that have been conditioned on high item confidence. The black vertical represents the
median estimate and its value is presented on each panel.
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